I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the incarceration rate in the United States has skyrocketed, presenting serious fiscal challenges to local governments, states, and the Federal Government.
1 In less than four decades, inmate populations have increased tenfold, from under 200,000 in 1971 to over 2 million in 2008.
2 The result-overcrowded prisons and jails-generates humanitarian, social, and legal problems. The implications are equally as severe, if not more severe, than the concomitant budgetary issues. 3 Many financially strained governments have found it necessary to adopt innovative corrections policies to reduce the cost of prison administration. The cornerstone of these efforts has been an increased dependency on contracts with private entities for correctional and rehabilitative services. 4 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1800.2 (2009) ("The legislature hereby finds that . . . contracting for portions of governmental services is a viable alternative considering the fiscal problems facing the state, in addition to the interest on the part of many citizens in reducing the overall size of government."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-30-601 (2008) ("It is the policy of the state of Montana to encourage innovative methods to provide the correctional resources necessary to confine persons convicted of crimes. The state recognizes that there may be benefits to confining convicted persons in private correctional facilities operated consistently with public policy.").
Currently, the Federal Government and most states authorize corrections privatization in some form. 5 Private prison contracts are intended to alleviate prison overcrowding and reduce corrections expenditures while bypassing the need for bonds, increased taxes, or funding referenda. 6 However, experience has shown that "the number of jailed criminals typically rises to fill whatever space is available," 7 and privatization has so far failed to temper prison crowding. Instead, the consistent demand for new prisons and jails has facilitated an in governmental spending, and corrections budgets continue to swell along with the prison crease in population.
8
Aside from its nonsuccess in improving crowded prison conditions, the privatization "remedy" has created additional financial, legal, and moral problems. The first of these problems relates to legitimacy. 9 When a private company assumes responsibility for the administration of inmate punishment and rehabilitation, it improperly undertakes to perform an inherently public 37 Lawson, supra note 35, at 318-19 ("The label 'penal populism' has been used by some authorities to describe the country's turn toward punitive penology. It reared its head when rehabilitation began to lose supporters, was never presented 'as a package for public debate,' gained unstoppable momentum during the last two decades of the twentieth century, and has only recently shown some signs of exhaustion. It deserves most of the credit, or most of the blame, for a criminal justice system that has 'produced a wave of building and filling prisons virtually unprecedented in human history,' and for rates of incarceration that qualify as disgraceful when measured against world standards.") (quoting Marie Gottschalk, Black Flower: Prisons and the Future of Incarceration, 582 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 196, 198 (2002) , and MARC MAURER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 9 (1999) ).
An expanding carceral system requires difficult budgetary choices. 38 However, contracting with the private sector to not only build, but also administer, prison facilities allows the Government to address the overcrowding problem, without facing the politically unpopular specter of prison bonds or tax increases. In the long run, this short-term fix only aggravates governmental corrections expenditures and creates additional economic and social problems. 
B. The Debate over Prison Privatization

III. PRISON ADMINISTRATION IS AN INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION
Delegating public responsibilities for inmate treatment and rehabilitation to private businesses implicates a concern that "governmental power-power coercive in nature-will be used to further the private interests of the private actor, as opposed to some different public interest." 48 Assigning the duties of inmate care-including the provision of food, clothing, sanitary supplies, medical care, and disciplinary authority-to profit-seeking entities entails obvious legal and moral questions. The constitutional doctrine of nondelegation prohibits the Government from assigning certain functions to financially interested private actors. 49 Similarly, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Office of Management and Budget's revised A-76 Circular also protect certain "inherently governmental functions" from privatization.
50
Under these legal guidelines, prison administration-a discretionary duty that directly impacts inmates' liberty-may not be outsourced to the private sector.
A. Due Process Requirements and the Nondelegation Doctrine Forbid Private Prison Administration
Incarceration, which renders every aspect of prisoners' physical and mental health, 
C. Delegating Prison Administration Is a Poor Policy Choice
The 70 This Note does not defend the record of federal, state, and local governments in terms of public penal administration. The gross human rights and civil rights violations that occur in prisons are by no means lim the private sphere. "[C]onditions in many prisons-public and private alike-fall far short of satisfying society's obligations to those it incarcerates." Dolovich, supra note 9, at 442. However, to reform prison policy and administration overa ited to ll, it is imperative that private actors with a financial stake in maintaining high incarceration rates and lengthy criminal sentences do not improperly influence the formation of policies that instead ought to serve the public interest. rehabilitation programs in the facilities they operate. seminars consisted of watching videos in which prisoners were beaten, stun-gunned, stripped naked, and subjected to unleashed dogs.
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The most effective means of lowering prison operating costs is to ensure that the ratio of prisoners per guard is as high as possible. 
B. The Profit Motive Imposes Severe Social and Economic
Harsh Criminal Laws Benefit the Private Prison Industry
The growth of private prison companies depends on rising incarceration rates and strict criminal sentencing laws. 
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Private prison companies are not simply passive recipients of these windfall-generating phenomena. Instead, recognizing the benefits they receive from strict sentencing laws and hig recidivism rates, they actively seek to ensure that these trends continue despite harmful effects . 86 See Dolovich, supra note 9, at 503. 87 In their March 1997 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, CCA noted that "the rate of construction of new facilities and the Company's potential for growth will depend on a number of factors, including crime rates and sentencing patterns in the United States." SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 29, at 4. 88 A study of individuals released from prison in 1994 found that 67.5% were rearrested within three years. BUREAU 4 OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 199 (2002) , available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. 89 See NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM'N, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 13-15 (Steven R. Donzinger ed., 1996) (detailing anticrime legislative enactments in the 1980s and 1990s); Darley, supra note 2, at 190-91; Gottschalk, supra note 33; Lawson, supra note 35; Vitello, supra note 34; Hunter, supra note 40, at 322- 23. on the inmates, the Government, and society as a whole. houses ate was recently sentenced to six months in federal prison for paying a legislative candid at least $20,000 to support construction of a new private facility in the state.
97
Instances of self-serving bribery are not limited to schemes that seek to affect broad policy change or embed a general preference for corrections privatization. In early 2009, it was discovered that a private juvenile detention center paid two Pennsylvania judges $2.6 million over five years to reject pleas for leniency and alternative punishments for hundreds of teens. 
2.
the Government, and society as a whole. incentive to provid e rehabilitation opportunities or educational or vocational training that might benefit inmates after release, except insofar as these services act to decrease the current cost of confinement."
Harsh Criminal Laws Do Not Reduce Crime Rates or Benefit Society
107
Programs common to public facilities such as substance addiction treatment, vocational education, and sentence credits for good behavior are largely nonexistent in private prisons.
108
Where private companies do establish rehabilitation programs, often as the result of contractual requirements, they maintain a financial interest in ensuring that they are poorly administered.
Successful rehabilitation efforts would encourage private prison compan 
The Purported Short-Term Economic Benefits of Prison Privatization Are Offset by Long-Term Economic Costs
Advocates of prison privatization argue that as a product of market competition and th efficiency of the private sector, private prisons are cheaper to operate than their public counterparts. 111 However, in a 1996 study, the General Accounting Office found that studies have occurred" under privatization contracts. 125 See Dolovich, supra note 9, at 492 ("Certainly, those contracts that provide for full-time on-site monitors are an improvement over those that allow for only occasional visits: the average permanent on-site monitor spends an average of 7.25 hours per day, working five days a week, in the monitored facility. But still, given the scope of f the interactions and activities within any given prison, it seems unlikely matter prison contracts and the range and extent o that comprehensive and meaningful oversight can be achieved by a single monitor spending an average of thirty-six hours a week on-site."); Freeman, supra note 123, at 171 (" [T] here is a limit to technocratic solutions. No how careful the [contract] drafter, some tasks are difficult to specify in contractual terms . . . ."). 126 See Dolovich, supra note 9, at 492-93.
Government nor the contractor would agree to such terms. The argument that privatization reduces the pressure on states' corrections budgets is disingenuous. Evidence indicates that reclaiming governmental authority over prisons that are currently under private control will not require a drastic increase in governmental corrections spending. To the contrary, abolishing pri vate prisons will promote long-term cost savings by virtue of corrections policies free from the influence of companies whose existence depends on a continually expanding carceral state.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There are many legal, moral, and policy arguments in support of a total prohibition on private prisons. Oversight of inmate care and rehabilitation should be conducted only by accountable government actors, and it is a clear violation of due process to abdicate that responsibility to entities whose interests are opposed to the goals of effective prison management. Private prison companies cannot be expected to adopt policies that would harm their financial well-being, and it is impossible to draft (much less agree to) contract requirements that could account for and control every act or decision that requires prison operators' discretion and judgment.
Thus, governments must regain complete authority over penal administration by way of statutory prohibitions on contracts with private prison companies. Once they have reclaimed their proper role in corrections administration, it will then be incumbent upon these governments to address the policies that created the prison overcrowding crisis in the first place. Excluding profit-driven interests from the realm of penal administration will legitimize the public debate over the effectiveness and propriety of criminal laws, increasing the likelihood that sentencing and corrections policies will be adopted with the interests of the public, and not of prison companies, in mind.
